Presidential Address: The Art of Convergent Comparison—Case Studies from China and India

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THIS ADDRESS WAS INTENDED to be and remains about global circulatory processes and the ways that human societies have sought to deploy, control, or regulate these processes. In this essay, I principally consider how nationalist ideologies regulate global circulatory processes. The parallel with the current COVID-19 crisis is evident, and my remarks do suggest some similarities. Although COVID-19 is not the topic I engage here, my theme alerts us to thinking methodologically about largely invisible or inconspicuous modes of circulation and their consequences, less dire but deeply transformative.

More than twenty years ago, Susanne Rudolph presented her views on comparative studies of empires in her AAS Presidential Address. It remains a classic statement about the methods and goals of comparative studies in Asia. Responding to the imposition of procrustean models of comparison of time based on the Western telos of history and state formation, she suggests a model of “integral” comparison beginning with observable parallel instances from below to formulate generalizations that can, in turn, reflect on the overlap and particularity of a relationship. In her study of the relationships of imperial formations with regional powers, she reveals features that both share with “and express variants of the many forms of integration worked out by other Asian empires” (Rudolph 1987, 731).

I follow this line of inquiry and hope to do justice to the dual frame of understanding particularity and generality. As a historian, my generality, however, refers to the circulatory processes that have been weaving—or entangling—the globe together into the modern era. For a brief example of circulatory history, consider Marxism in China. Marxist ideas entered China through various points of contact with French, Japanese, and, of course, the Soviet Bolsheviks and the Comintern, through which the activities of M. N. Roy, an Indian Marxist, played an important initial role. In China, this ideology of the proletariat was converted into a peasant revolution, theorized and sanctioned by Mao Zedong as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (MLMT). Subsequently, in the post–World War II period, MLMT circulated in the developing world as a peasant revolutionary doctrine. However, in recent decades, it has reemerged as the revolutionary path of tribal communities, whether in Latin America, India, Nepal, or elsewhere.

As dynamic forms, I want to see the ways in which circulatory processes are accepted, resisted, and affectively or innovatively vernacularized in particular societies. The circulatory nature of historical processes that neither begin nor end with national goals reveals that they are much wider and even planetary processes. Thus, my first theme is the study of...
of circulatory processes historically, both in the pre-national period and in the period of modern nationalism. The second theme I introduce is the idea of convergent comparison. I argue that circulatory history is an excellent means of conducting comparative history because the circulatory connector serves as the comparator.

The zone of convergence is the impact space of circulatory forces that, often implicitly or indirectly, elicit or demand a response; the responses of various social formations, in turn, form the basis of convergent comparison. This method allows us to see that developments within nations and in pre-national formations are conditioned as much by less visible circulatory global forces as by purely national or internal processes. It also allows us to see what is novel, innovative, or continuous, not only in what happens but also how it is represented, narrated, and discoursed—that is, its historical meaning.

A third topic I explore is the pattern or profile of passage/resistance of circulatory processes in a society. Sometimes, blockage may be undertaken for the interests of society as a whole—as in the case of the current epidemic—or for a configuration of interests and power. At the same time, of course, regulatory escape is almost inevitable. Societies develop a profile of what and how ingress is allowed at different levels and spheres. Finally, I probe the ideology of modern nationalism as a regulatory force; I suggest that the profile functions differently at the political/discursive level compared with that of the cultural sensorium. The impact of global circulatory forces needs to be grasped from a gestalt optic.

Why China and India—or what, in the pre-national period, we may designate as the Sinosphere and Indosphere? The method of convergent comparison could be applied to many pairings or a range of societies as long as they have certain apparently comparable dimensions or institutions, and as long as the circulatory force impacts them. My choice of China and India emerges from my personal study of these societies and some evidently comparable features: population size, agrarian civilizations, long histories, as well as their possible impact on the future of Asia and the world. The comparative study of the Sinosphere and the Indosphere as parallel alternative “civilizations” dates from Christian missionary accounts, although its modern foundations were laid by Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1975) in the early nineteenth century. Hegel emphasized the excess of state over society in “China” and the excess of society (read: caste) in “India.” This comparative lack allowed him to imagine the perfect match in the actualization of Spirit in the Prussian state. More recent scholarship has tried to break from this teleological paradigm by emphasizing connections between these two large, populous, and post-imperial societies. I try to show that both societies were responding to certain circulatory forces, whether emanating from within or beyond, directly or indirectly, in comparable ways. The circulatory—and utterly immanent—process reveals ways of understanding history that are the planetary “ground”—in the gestalt sense—of national histories.

Both premodern and modern authorities seek to regulate what penetrates society, although modern capitalist societies have incalculably higher and accelerating rates of

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1I refer to the pre-national societies that came to be known as China and India in the national period as the Sinosphere and Indosphere or by the names of the dynasties and rulers. I do this not only because addressing these periods by the contemporary nation-state nomination would be anachronous, but also because several different nationalities emerged from these formations, whether or not they achieved sovereign status.
circulation, together with more developed regulatory formats. Indeed, the modern nation form is itself a circulatory model of a total society constantly remaking itself. It need hardly be said that uneven development in global capitalism and historical circumstances and conditions evidently create significant differences on the ground that convergent comparison seeks to capture. Nonetheless, the structural similarities in the nation form generate parallels in the modes of ingress and blockage.

The first part of this essay discusses circulatory histories in the premodern Sino-sphere and Indosphere through the lens of Buddhism. Part two engages convergent comparison in the emerging nations of modern China and India, exploring the parallels in their responses to Western imperialism, which are informed by circulating ideologies, strategies, and mechanisms. Part three analyzes the common structure of nationalist ideology, particularly as the nation form becomes simultaneously the carrier and the object of circulatory change, generating an irreconcilable tension—or the aporia—between the global and the national. In part four, I consider the ways in which the ideological aporia in China and India was addressed beyond discursive intellectual or political modes through the “cultural sensorium” in the arts of convergent comparison.

**Circulatory Histories**

I have argued for some years that the histories of collective subjects—such as nations, communities, or civilizations—are not linear and tunnelled but circulatory, much like oceanic currents. Processes emerging in one form in place A flow to many places, B, C, etc., where they interact with other local and translocal forces and reemerge in place A, though often recognized as something else or sometimes misrecognized as the same. Relevant to this discussion is how human-initiated agentive actions, while they can lead to intended consequences, also disperse across time and space with unrecognized effects on other processes, both human and nonhuman, and generate counter-finalities.

Recent work on connected histories, particularly of the Old World, has presented a picture of Afro-Eurasia as a deeply interconnected historical sphere since at least the Bronze Age, populated by sprawling networks, expanding and contracting empires, traveling ideas and practices, and circulating microbes, viruses, and species of all kinds (Goody 2007). The connections provided by the landed and maritime Silk Road are too well known to be recounted here; I will just use some illustrative material.

Among the early expressions of circulations from Eurasian empires that I have come across is that between the Achaemenid dynasty (ca. 700–330 BCE), arguably the first Eurasian empire, and the Mauryan Empire (322–185 BCE) in the Indo-Gangetic plain (Thapar 2012, 160–64). Sheldon Pollock (2006) has indicated the great differences between the Achaemenid and the Maurya Ashokan models of empire, yet the mode of communicating imperial power and authority (if not sovereignty) across great parts of the subcontinent by Ashoka bears the undeniable imprint of the Achaemenids, who created the monumental inscription with animal figures atop fluted capitals. The Ashokan pillar with the triple lion capital bearing his inscriptions and symbols, including the Buddhist chakra or the wheel of Dharma, which today is India’s national emblem, marks the impact of the Achaemenid declarations of their sovereign status across their vast empire a few centuries earlier, and it is found in their principal cities, such as Persepolis and Susa (see figures 1–3). Ashoka, who, according to Frederick Asher’s account,
would have had no trouble recruiting artists from the “civilized world” of the time, di-
tributed the pillars with naturalistic carvings of animals across the empire to commu-
icate his inscriptions and sovereignty as a Dharmic ruler (Asher 2011, 430; Falk 2006;
Pollock 2006).

My interest in the circulation of the Ashokan pillar came about serendipitously. I was
wandering the streets of Chiang Mai in Thailand when I encountered a gateway flanked
by two columns that seemed identical to the Ashokan pillar (figure 4). Thinking it must be
an Indian consulate, I discovered that it was a gateway to a Buddhist temple or wat, and
the pillars were replicas of the older and more monumental Dharmic pillar at Wat U
Mong near Chiang Mai built by King Mangrai in the thirteenth century (figure 5).

Seeking to track the earlier expressions of this symbol of religious and political authority,
I found my way back to Persepolis. Indeed, the Achaemenids did not have a tradition of

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**Figures 1–3.** Persepolis pillars (Achaemenes, sixth to fourth centuries BCE; top left
and bottom) and Ashokan pillar (Mauryas, third century BCE; top right) as modes of
disseminating imperial sovereignty.
stone architecture and drew on influences from Mesopotamia, Egypt, and other places, and on into the mists of history (Boardman 1998; Curtis and Tallis 2005).

I will stay with Buddhism briefly to illustrate an important premodern mode of circulation: resistance and passage in Asia. In East Asia, Buddhism did not arrive directly from South Asian points of emergence. It penetrated the Han and post-Han Sinosphere and beyond from several different nodes of recirculation in Southeast Asia, Tibet, and Central Asia. It was carried by merchants and monks, including Indo-Scythians, Sogdians, and Parthians, whose networks stretched to many Chinese cities and ports (Sen 2003). The translation of the many Buddhist texts over the centuries is an important space of convergence involving multiple languages; oral, written, and visual media; and diverse ideas, not only from the Sinosphere and the Indosphere, but from several other parts of Asia (Legittimo 2014).

The popularity of Buddhism in the land of the Buddha during the first millennium in the Indosphere and until this day in the Sinosphere is widely known. Buddhist ideas and practices in the arts, literature, publishing, and conceptions of life, nature, and the afterlife created a sea change across Asian popular and folk culture (with a small c). At the same time, it faced fierce intellectual and political resistance from the intellectual elites or “clerisies,” particularly when the latter were favored by the relevant court in question. Intellectually, the penetration of Mahayana Buddhist conceptions into the Confucian worldview and into the Advaita Vedanta school of Brahmanic thought was resisted through argumentation, denial, and repression. Nonetheless, these engagements resulted in significant reformulations of both Advaita and the production of neo-Confucian

Figures 4–5. Ashokan pillar at the gates of a Buddhist temple, Chiang Mai, Thailand. City branch of Wat U Mong, Chiang Mai (left). Replica of Ashokan pillar at Wat U Mong near Chiang Mai, built by King Mangrai, ca. thirteenth century (right).
worldviews, even as the latter came to be seen as emblematic of the indigenous high traditions (Culture with a big C) of the two societies.

The influence of Buddhism on the Cultures of the Indosphere and the Sinosphere, often unacknowledged and, still more often, vigorously denied, actually seems to represent a source of innovation and creativity. For instance, the neo-Confucian ethical principles of benevolence and gradational love (renyi) were strengthened by the underpinning of Mahayana ontological universalism and Wang Yangming’s nondualistic, transcendent mind derived from Zen conceptions of the same (Fu 1973, 379, 392). In India, early Advaita Vedantic thinkers such as Gaudapada and Shankara were influenced by Mahayana Buddhist ideas and arguments, particularly the notion of the impermanence and illusoriness of the phenomenal world and Nagarjuna’s doctrine of two kinds of truth. In a source book on Vedantism, the editors sum up the controversy of Buddhist influence on Hinduism thus: “In any event a close relationship between the Mahayana schools and Vedanta did exist with the latter borrowing some of the dialectical techniques, if not the specific doctrines, of the former” (Deutsch and Dalvi 2004, 126, 157).

As suggested earlier, I make a distinction between the culture with a small c of everyday routine practices and relationships that change more incrementally or unself-reflexively and the high Culture of civilizational discourse and authenticity. Although they are frequently interactive and mutually influential, the different temporalities of each are critical to grasping modes of global and local circulations, as I will show in the latter part of this essay.2

Doubtless, Buddhism’s impact on high culture was facilitated by its capacity to assimilate its conceptions and conventions with popular cultural assumptions and language. As I will try to show in more detail later, a new set of practices, ideas, and conventions ingresses little-c culture in routine activities and daily life more readily. At a doctrinal or discursive level of high Culture, the more systematic ideas encounter resistance and opposition. Nonetheless, through various modes of reciprocal appropriations, disguise, theft, resignification, and superscription, they influenced each other significantly in this period. Staying with Buddhism, let us explore a few more instances of the cultural logic.

During the Tang dynasty (618–907), which had a strong Central Asian presence, the Buddhists employed familiar Confucian vocabulary to identify the emperor as the sage king who was equivalent to a Boddhisattva possessing the virtue of “forbearance” (ren) (Orzech 1989, 21). The sage king and the Boddhisattva were part of the same continuum and cosmic order. Chinese monks were familiar with the narrative of Ashoka as the great monarch who supported the Buddhist sangha and built stupas marking pilgrimage routes (John Strong, cited in Sen 2003, 9). The mid-Tang monk at the imperial court, Bukong/Amoghavajra (eighth century), institutionalized a design to create a kind of dual sovereignty that was well suited to not only enhance Buddhist power but also create an imperial idiom that could bring Buddhist Central Asia into the Tang domain. Bukong oversaw the building of a series of monastery complexes and pilgrimage centers, such as those on the five peaks of Mount Wutai, which became increasingly important

2Note that the “Culture” versus “culture” difference is not the same as Robert Redfield’s (1955) Great and Little traditions. While local elements are certainly more prominent in “culture,” the level of awareness or concern about the “foreign” is much lower in these more routine or “unimportant” activities.
particularly as the non-Han emperors of Sinosphere performed their role as Boddhisattva, a model of Buddhist imperial rule directed towards the Tibeto-Mongol nomadic world (Orzech 2002, 72–73).

Another expression of creative appropriation by the receiving cultures is what I identify as circulatory iteration: when an item is iteratively folded into cultures to create similar spaces but with new roles or functions. While Mount Wutai became a node linking Central Asian, especially Tibetan Buddhism to the Chinese heartland, Tang imperial patronage also transformed the Sinosphere into a sacred Buddhist land. Chinese Buddhists declared that the Snow Mountain upon which the Boddhisattva Manjusri was prophesied to appear was none other than Mount Wutai. In due course, Korean and Japanese Buddhists declared monastic complexes on the reinscribed landscapes of Korea’s Mount Odae and Japan’s Mount Atago and Mount Tonomine to be the Mount Wutai where Manjusri would also appear. Thus, they generated their own centrality in the Buddhist world at the same time that they enhanced the prestige of Mount Wutai. Even South Asian monks who became aware of the legends around Manjusri made pilgrimages to Mount Wutai, marking the recognition of the Sinosphere as a new center of Buddhism (Sen 2003, 76–86).

Mahayana notions of ritual space, universalism, karma, and sin influenced not only popular culture but also Daoism. It is perhaps less well known that there was an intense two-way traffic between Daoist and Buddhist practices and ideas. An apocryphal sutra declares that the Buddha preached that life can be prolonged by worship of the Big Dipper, which is none other than the abode of the One supreme, the Dao (Mollier 2009, 136–37, 185). Indeed, the Buddhist disguise of the Daoist idea enabled it to circulate not only in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese but also through Buddhist Central Asia in Uighur, Mongolian, and Tibetan recensions. Conversely, the Daoist Guan Yin or Avalokitesvara, Jiuku Tianzun (figure 6), was evidently introduced because the novel savior figure had become too popular for the Daoists to ignore. Visual representations, for instance, in tomb paintings or in architecture, show how symbols from different traditions often fused to serve functional or aesthetic choices (Sen 1999). In these ways, images could push back high Culture’s predilection for purity even while the representations absorbed new ideals of transcendence. As Tansen Sen (2019, 188) argues, “While foreign images helped the followers associate with the broader Buddhist world, the local innovations created a notion of the sacredness of their own land. This duality was crucial in creating and integrating the Buddhist cosmopolis.”

**MODERN CHINA AND INDIA IN CONVERGENT COMPARISON**

The histories of the emergent nations in the modern Sinosphere and Indosphere are, of course, different because of their institutional and geophysical contexts. Nonetheless, we see the impact of similar forces upon them, with remarkably parallel and comparable effects. In significant part, this has to do with the acceleration of global processes, but the global form of the nation also induces these parallels. The method of circulatory history and convergent comparison does not deny the role of institutional processes that produce activities along internal and contingent pathways. At the same time, neither institutions nor activities are impervious to circulatory processes; the two are continuously
interwoven. Indeed, the goal of this essay is to show precisely how such behavior adapts to and utilizes these ingestions.

As we have seen, the Sinosphere and the Indosphere had long been intertwined through circulatory forces—such as inter-Asian overland and maritime trade, Buddhism, Islam, the introduction of New World silver into Asia, and not least the opium-for-tea trade. It is with this last momentous commercial operation in the mid-nineteenth century that we begin to see convergent developments in the two societies. The disruptions caused by an aggressive capitalist imperialism spearheaded by the British led in both cases to climactic uprisings such as the 1857 Rebellion in British India and more indirectly to the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) in late Qing China. In quelling these

Figure 6. The Daoist Avolokitesvara, Jiuku Tianzun.

3The Taiping Rebellion originated among porters in southern China who carried the trade between Canton and the Yangzi Valley because they were displaced by the post–Opium War shift of the trading networks to the eastern ports. The weakening of the Qing in the south as a result of the Opium War and its consequences allowed Taiping control over much of the area south of the Yangzi.
rebellions, which evidenced a brew of familiar and novel patterns, states in both societies were obliged to undertake institutional reforms (new schools, courts, police, militaries, and so on) that resulted in the gradual expansion of modernizing groups and practices, concentrated in China’s treaty ports and India’s larger cities.

The rise of modernizing elites in the late nineteenth century led to the development of the “public sphere” represented by modern educational institutions, the professions, law, and the press, as well as modern business practices in the urban sectors of both countries by the early years of the twentieth century. Attendant parallels in the political sphere were quite remarkable. In British India, the reformist Moderates who urged the “British to be more British in India” were matched by the early generation of reformists in the Qing whose movement culminated in the Hundred Days’ Reform, conducted under the auspices of an enlightened young emperor who was expected to transition into a constitutional monarch on the model of Meiji Japan. The weakness of these moderate reformists produced a more radical generation of nationalists—the 1911 revolutionaries of “China” and the “extremists” of “India” who referred to themselves as Chinese and Indians—around the same time in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Indian and Chinese revolutionaries even found common meeting places, as in Japan, which became the hub of pan-Asianism (Karl 2002; Murthy, forthcoming). The circulating techniques of assassinations, boycotts, and demonization of the Other(s) were adopted in both countries.

Mass movements of political mobilization also began in both societies at the same time—shortly after the end of World War I and the Russian Revolution (a period of great global ferment)—and continued unabated until midcentury. Both Sun Yat-sen and Gandhi brought back circulatory ideas honed by experiences working with immigrant labor communities. Moreover, these experiences had to be translated from the urban centers into the vernacular in the rural hinterlands. To be sure, there were significant differences—not least in the leadership’s attitude toward violence—between Mao’s Communist Party and Gandhi’s Congress Party. But the general framework of a mass movement—its goals, rhetoric, visual or representational techniques, and results—allows for far richer comparability than has been assumed or attempted to date. Although these movements were certainly cognizant of one another, the question of formal exchanges or conscious imitation of practices is more difficult to ascertain. Nonetheless, these parallel movements are highly suggestive of the globally standardizing ground of historical developments during this period.

The historical impact of the anti-imperialist movement created a significant zone of convergence for the first decade or so among decolonizing nations represented by the iconic Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Solidarity in 1955. China, following the Soviet Union, explicitly constructed its command economy upon anti-capitalist foundations, while the onset of the Cold War gave other new nations, such as India, the ideas and space for autarkic development, import substitution, and socialist tendencies. The 1950s saw more cooperation between the two countries than any time since (Ghosh 2017, 2020). Moreover, though the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were founded on different political principles, after riding a crest of mass movements, leaders in both societies faced comparable imperatives of nation and state building.
The leaders of the two nations initially believed that their recent political achievements as well as their older historical greatness entitled them to lead the new nations of the world along alternative paths. Though neither society was committed to competitive capitalism, nonetheless, the progressive vision of history that promised endless growth and welfare grounded in the territorial nation-state meant that even socialist societies would have to engage in competition (for resources and technology), both internally and externally. Growth entailed expansionism that was not only territorial and economic, but political and psychological as well. From an outcome-blind 1950s perspective, India’s subsequent development of a nuclear program was almost as unexpected as China’s turn to market capitalism.4

Economically, Chinese per capita growth has surged far ahead of Indian growth since the 1980s, but the method of convergent comparison holds for the postwar period as it does for the experiences of many other decolonizing and developing societies. A glimpse into these convergent forces over three periods or phases reveals comparable processes separated in the two countries by about a decade or so. It is important to note that the issues and problems in one phase do not disappear but often merge with the dominant circulatory process of the next phase.

During the first phase in the 1950s and 1960s, both countries were confronted with the demands of building the state and the nation and had to deal with counternational nationalist movements, among other issues now seen as “traditional,” “parochial,” or “feudal” by the new state. In China, many of these structures had been eliminated during the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (1945–49); but the new communist regime was still saddled with inherited attitudes and behavior as well as with the daunting task of territorial integration. During the first ten years of the PRC, the Communist Party was able to fulfill many of its goals for rural transformation, although some of its methods landed it in the Great Famine of 1960. Indian elites were more rooted in landed wealth, caste, and linguistic and religious institutions that would have to be gradually transformed, or at least appeased, before they could be overcome. Although Indian agencies were able to redistribute more land to the landless than is generally acknowledged, without radical land reform, as took place in China and much of East Asia, it was not able to address the rural problem adequately.

The newly established Chinese government encountered problems in consolidating its sovereignty claims with regard to Tibet, and in the 1960s, it fought territorial conflicts with its various neighbors, including its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. In 1979, Chinese troops invaded fellow communist Vietnam. These conflicts have been mostly addressed, but some old ones, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Indian border issues, together with other new tensions regarding maritime sovereignty in the South China Sea, fester and could well emerge as flash points in the near future. India faced an equally vexing set of external challenges, emerging from the divisions of the British Empire, particularly with regard to Kashmir and the Himalayan borders, which have continued to fester and boil over, as in the recent conflict between China and India in the Galwan Valley.

4A more detailed discussion of the materials in this section can be found in Duara and Perry (2018; see the introduction and the various essays in the volume). For an overview of parallel developments in the two countries, see in particular the appendix to that volume, “India-China Timeline, 1947–2016” (331–42).
Internally, the government policy of reorganizing administrative states along linguistic lines limited the fissiparous effects much anticipated at the time; but to this day, the Indian nation-state faces demands for statehood (or provincial status) from myriad groups, prolonging the ongoing task of nation and state building.

During a second comparable phase in the 1960s and 1970s, we see the rise of social movements and demand for rights. While the logic of citizenship rights was embedded in the nation-state model from the start, the dominant form of group identity politics—of class identity, in the case of China—tended to obscure the potential of rights-based citizenship and civil society of the sort usually associated with the modern nation-state. Beginning in the 1960s, a global wave of protest movements against war, inequalities, and inequities spread prominently across the West but also in China with the Cultural Revolution and in India with the student and revolutionary movements. These social movements, although increasingly controlled by the revolutionary political faction in China, continued through the 1970s. Indeed, as the postwar generation came to political maturity across Asia, civil society movements began to call for the replacement of military authoritarian regimes in South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and elsewhere.

In India, civil society received a fillip from opposition to the suppression of freedoms during and after the Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi (1975–77), when the press, elite intellectuals, political mass movements, and, not least, a shamed judiciary, launched a range of rights-based movements and judgments. In China, while the institutional guarantees and social space for civil rights and rights activism are heavily dependent upon the dictates of the party-state, the Constitution of 1982 declared the goal of introducing “rule by law” and the need to enhance “citizens’ right to legal justice.” Laws instituted in the aftermath of this constitutional guarantee evoked an enthusiastic response from many groups in society (Nair 2018; Perry 2011, 30–61; Ruparelia 2018). Nonetheless, the twin legacies of a strong, authoritarian state and socialist ideals continue to shape Chinese society.

The third phase references contemporary globalization, a period that came into being with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of Soviet-style socialism, and the declaration of the Washington Consensus. Often characterized as a period of “neoliberalism,” many of its core ideas have circulated within Asia over the last twenty-five to thirty years, albeit with significant modifications. By and large, neoliberalism involves a trend toward privatization of public services and the commons (such as water and forests), engagement of public-private partnerships, and, more fundamentally, a model and mentality of market efficiency that is viewed as the organizing principle for state and society alike. While they seldom adopt the new model wholesale, many Asian states have introduced some version or other of its component principles—for instance, by privatizing some industries and services or by creating special economic zones or spheres of trade and technology where the market functions more freely than elsewhere.

The two states of China and India also responded to the neoliberal ideas often advocated by multilateral financial and other agencies, such as the World Trade Organization, with new models of economic growth (Mukherjee 2019). The liberal idea of a “rational actor” free to pursue his or her interests in the marketplace is being replaced by the neoliberal idea of a citizen in whom “human capital” must be invested to develop his or her full potential (Akçali, Yanik, and Hung 2015). Human capital formation emphasizes entrepreneurial and efficiency capacities over, or in addition to, subsidies and...
grants-in-aid. Examples include grassroots microcredit, microfinance projects that seek to engage rural people as entrepreneurs, and new medical insurance schemes in which families are required to make steep co-payments for services that were once free. Local cadres in China are encouraged to develop income-generating schemes to enrich rural communities. The government of India has launched a program to give every needy household a bank account in which to deposit previous in-kind subsidies as cash payments. Whether or not this financialization of society proves beneficial, the idea of the citizen is changing fundamentally in the process. At the same time, as Nara Dillon (2018, 174) has argued, “the net impact of ‘neoliberal’ welfare reforms in China and India has been the first significant expansion of their welfare states since the postwar period.”

THE CIRCULATORY NATION FORM

I now turn to the visual dimensions of convergent comparison in the modern period. We caught a glimpse of visual circulations of Buddhist images in the premodern period. As noted, unlike the period before the twentieth century in Asia, the circulatory items are not ideas, practices, or material items alone, but the nation form itself. Despite the blockages posed by, and resistance to, imperialist nations in Asia, the form of the nation-state circulates rapidly and becomes institutionalized in the different societies. From a cultural perspective, the thematics of identity become more salient, the tensions generated more acute and volatile, and the modes of response and management also more comparable.

We are familiar with the basic dimensions of the nation form. It consists of popular and territorial sovereignty based on the imagined community of the Self versus the Other. In this respect, it is fundamentally an identitarian polity. The Other is often both internal and external to the territorial nation, and the intensity of this binary identity is historically variable. Equally central to the nation form is the tension between “tradition” and modernity or progress. This tension is embedded in the self-perception of the nation-state as the subject of a linear history that demands change even while it retains its identity as the self-same subject.

The sovereign nation emerged in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe following upon the advent of early modern confessional states that tended to homogenize polities by religious affiliation and an accompanying disciplinary revolution. These factors also enabled the successful states to launch capitalism on a global scale. By the nineteenth century, these states had created a common language, national culture, and education system equipped to function in an industrial society and gain competitive control of global resources.

In the course of reproducing the nation form in their societies, nationalists in China and in India faced parallel problems. The tension between “tradition” and modern, which we often see—or used to see—as analytical categories, is best understood in the process of the making of the national self, for the individual and the collective. What is called tradition is sometimes an “invention” and can even be innovative, but it is also often a

5Hy Luong has reminded me that the design of a social formation was sometimes also absorbed in premodern Asia, notably the adoption of the Chinese model by Vietnam.
reification or freezing of an ongoing process of adjustment to life. “Tradition” is an obstacle to progress and modernity but also is necessarily reified as a symbol of identity. This binary is inseparable from the global-national relationship outlined here.

As a dynamic circulatory process, nations tend to form themselves continuously from standards, norms, and practices of economically more advanced or other models of nations. By assimilating the “best practices” of nationhood, it can deliver the goods of development to its citizens as well as to create a sleek citizenry for global competition. Among the circulatory norms, I frequently cite the case of the “child,” which I find particularly compelling. In agricultural societies in Asia, a child is a child until he or she is old enough to work in the fields, which could begin at the age of five. However, when we look at national constitutions of twentieth-century states, a child is assumed conceptually and legally to remain a child until the age of eighteen. The modern national structure of relationship between child and adult has ramifications across society that cause nations to resemble each other more than their past forms.

At the same time, the nation also has to misrecognize these adoptions and celebrate its alleged uniqueness and enduring historical, even timeless identity. This misrecognition is required for the claims of sovereignty to manage, in turn, a fundamentally anarchic global condition in which states with different capacities appropriate circulating global resources, material and cultural. Some of the symbols of timeless traditions and national authenticity include the ideal of “pure woman,” motherhood (Mother India), the indigenous origins of science, the ancestral father of the nation (e.g., the Yellow Emperor), and so on. Tradition, authenticity, and uniqueness serve as anchors to sustain the self-same subject not only for psychic stability, but also for sovereignty claims against internal and external, real or imagined threats.

Fundamentally, nations do not possess the enduring inside and outside that are so basic to their self-recognition in politics and scholarship. Rather, the nation is constituted by the volatile tension between its globality and its nationness. Let me cite an example. In the developing world, the second half of the twentieth century saw a great number of anti-American and anti-imperialist demonstrations on the streets and in the media protesting the encroachment or violation of their national sovereignty. Yet the very demonstrators who were raising banners and throwing stones could be found soon after applying for visas to study in US universities. Moreover, many of them, Indians, Chinese, and others, would go on to become US citizens and live their lives as American nationals. I do not bring up this case to point out any personal hypocrisy. If hypocrisy is involved, it is systemic. What I have called cognitive (or unreflexive) globalization shapes every national—often through small-c culture—who has the opportunity to be exposed to it. Yet the regime of national authenticity systematically misrecognizes or devalues this constitutive element of globalization.

This constitutive tension or aporia between cognitive globalism and nationalist misrecognition is what I referred to in the introduction as the ideological structure of nationalism. This tension is often too acute to be addressed by rational discourses of a national society. Rather, it is managed and mediated through the senses—visual, aural, sound, touch, smell—creating a “cultural” sensorium. As I tried to show in the segment on the early period, circulatory culture with a small c frequently penetrates through routine activities and the senses. In the case of the modern nation-state, this kind of sensory transplantation has to do the work not only across the national body, but often with increasing speed.
I focus on the response to Western visual art forms in the cultural sensorium to explore comparative convergence in this section. I believe the other senses also play an important role. The role of music and sound is well developed in the literature of nationalism, and we need only think of the hymnal and martial qualities that mark the common form of national anthems, yet they are capable of generating great emotional responses for a particular nation. Space limitations permit me to introduce only one brief example of the functions of taste and odor.

The durian is notoriously famous around the world as a fruit with an overpowering smell and taste, yet it is beloved by many in its native Southeast Asia. Andrea Montonari, following the lead of Norbert Elias’s *The Civilizing Process* (1994), has documented the changing perceptions of the odor and taste of this fruit by Europeans from the fifteenth century through the late colonial period. Premodern Europeans rarely commented on its pungent odor, likening it to strong cheese and even finding it flavorful, comparable to “excellent meat.” By the nineteenth century, during the heyday of European colonialism when colonial distinctiveness was valorized against native cultures—and we might add, when garbage was disposed away from European cities—the status of the fruit declined precipitously, and it was described as “nauseating,” “fetid,” and even “unchaste.” It came to epitomize “irrationality, gluttony, intemperance” and all that was uncivilized among natives (Montonari 2017, 402–6). Unremarkably, the postcolonial state and elites in several Southeast Asian countries have banned the fruit in hotels and some forms of public transport (Fuller 2007). In recent years, however, the fruit has undergone a transvaluation in the local public sphere, reappearing as the “king of fruits” surrounded by sniff and savor connoisseur gatherings. Indeed, it is popularly said that one’s taste in durian may determine whether one is an authentic Southeast Asian. Perhaps the cunning of nationalism (or regionalism, in this case) may still convert the durian from a small-c culture to Culture.

Let us turn to the circulation of Western art forms, beginning with Renaissance-style oil paintings, perspectival space, realism, naturalism, and the like. To be sure, there was a fair amount of artistic circulation within Asian societies as well, and it has been discussed by authors such as Aida Yuen Wong (2006) and others. I will restrict my analysis here to the ways in which the realm of art plays a role in the cultural sensorium of the two societies in managing the global/national aporia.

The impact of modern Western forms was understood and debated in both the Sinosphere and the Indosphere with their rich artistic backgrounds from the turn of the nineteenth century, if not earlier. Western forms became problematic once nationalism gained ground and nationalists and artists began to view their artistic practices and heritage more self-consciously as “traditional.” This was largely an elite discourse and did not just seek to shore up a national tradition but also included innovative practices of taking the best of East and West. In other words, it became part of the nationalist problematic of identity. Meanwhile, the more routine artistic practices continued to develop with what came to hand.

In China, “national art” (guohua) came to be represented by ink paintings during the Republic. Some of the great and deeply cosmopolitan artists working in this tradition (xieyi), such as Xu Beihong, produced contemporary subjects and were also influenced...
by Western conventions (Clarke 2008, 276–77). In Yan’an, Mao declared that literature and art had to be nationalized (minzuhua) to become the art of the people. Painters during the Maoist period sought to develop indigenous styles of New Year prints and serial picture stories and to “nationalize” oil painting (Hung 2007, 812). Despite ideological pronouncements, art instruction, training, and official revolutionary paintings of the Maoist period continued to be dominated by Western conceptions and techniques, particularly of realist—including socialist realist—art that was reinforced by the Soviet model (Hung 2007, 787; see also Andrews 1994). The revolutionary artist and party spokesman Jiang Feng, who, together with Xu Beihong, continued to propagate Western realist conventions and styles, cut through the problem by arguing that the latter could be the basis of Chinese “national forms” if the subject matter of the art related to the lives of the people (Andrews 1994, 22, 24).

The history of Western styles of realistic art in the Indosphere dates to the early nineteenth century. Christopher Pinney’s splendid study of its history, “Photos of the Gods”: The Printed Image and Political Struggle in India (2004), not unexpectedly, reveals that Renaissance and post-Renaissance conceptions and styles, including linearity, perspective, and naturalism, were propagated by British authorities as part of the colonial project of disenchanting the natives. He emphasizes, however, the ways in which Indian artists, from oil painters, lithographers, photographers, commercial publishers of calendars and posters, and others appropriated these techniques and conventions for their own purposes, re-enchanting them to “make the gods more real” and repurposing them for political purposes. In her study of mapmaking and the emergence of the geo-body, Sumathi Ramaswamy (2008) shows how the map as an abstract, measured, and territorial object came to be enlivened by nationalist and demotic imagery, thereby planting the novel figure of the Indian nation in the imagination. In both China and India, despite the high culture emphasis on national or traditional art, Western art forms came to be absorbed at various levels in innovative ways by producing vernacular imagery and meanings in the new styles.

I became personally aware of the common properties of these circulating representations upon encountering an exhibition of contemporary Indian and Chinese artists in Shanghai in 2010. Organized by the West Heavens exchange program, the exhibition, Place · Time · Play: India-China Contemporary Art Exhibition, featuring several artists (including the photographic arts and installations), was the result of “an unprecedented series of contacts, reciprocal visits and discussions involving artists, curators and intellectuals from India and China.” I was particularly struck by a slideshow installation by Gigi Scaria, titled No Parallel? (2010) displaying two parallel slideshows of images of Mahatma Gandhi and Chairman Mao in their iconic leadership modes (figure 7).

Although, of course, Mao and Gandhi represented radically different ideologies, Scaria’s visuals ask if we can detect any parallels in the modes of depiction of their activities as political icons. He juxtaposes the two founding fathers in photographic postures that are very alike: addressing mass meetings, working thoughtfully in their private spaces, engaged in intimate and working conversation with their political lieutenants, and the like. The visuals express the unprecedented but parallel ways in which the mass leader is presented to the nation as a new type of leader, of the people and of the nation in Asia. They convey unfamiliar global modes in familiar vernacular materials and expressions.
Let me pursue a bit further two other images of Mao and Gandhi. I encountered the Mao image (Perry 2008) and the reference to the Gandhi image (Ramaswamy 2008) in the pages of this journal, and I am thankful to the authors for triggering my interest in them. I revisit them to see how they may address the aporia between cognitive globalism and misrecognized nationalism. The image as symbol can bear great passions, but they are conveyed through properties which pass relatively unrecognized. I call this mode of communication an infra-cultural language, a part of culture with a small c. It includes cultural properties such as the formal qualities of landscape, posture, figural relations of distance or intimacy, as well as framings, props, details and items of familiarity/unfamiliarity, and, especially, desirability/undesirability. There is a complex relationship between the content or the message and the infra-cultural language of the art. This infra-culture includes the techniques and technologies of the medium (e.g., print, photograph, oil on canvas, “photos of gods”), but it is also composed of the cultural properties described earlier. There is an interaction between the two that can reinforce, enhance, or devalue the content of the message; it can also plant the subsoil for ingressing circulatory forces to grow rhizomatically, possibly with longer-term effects.

Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan was painted by Liu Chunhua during the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967. Liu was a student at the Central Academy of Arts and Crafts. In Elizabeth Perry’s monograph (2012) on the politics of the 1922 Anyuan coal mine strike, a landmark event—though much revised—in CCP history, she discusses the politics behind this painting. Perry cites Liu to the effect that he was inspired to paint this monumental revolutionary icon by a Renaissance painting (Perry 2012, 184). The Cultural Revolution was eponymously about politics of the arts as much as about revolution, and Liu’s painting was selected as part of the project to discredit Liu Shaoqi, who was the primary organizer of the 1922 strike, and replace him with Mao. With 900 million copies of the painting printed, this icon may have been one of the most widely circulated revolutionary posters in the world (figure 8).

Both Perry and art historian Julia Andrews emphasize the religious and, I should add, the Christian dimensions of the painting. Perry states that “religious conviction was indeed the prescribed reaction to the painting was made clear in newspaper editorials at the time.” Guangming ribao, for example, characterized Liu’s painting as a “hymn in praise of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line having vanquished China’s Khruschev’s counterrevolutionary revisionist line.” References to Mao’s revolutionary miracles and
ritualized ceremonies to welcome the arrival of the copies of the painting strike a distinct religious tone (Perry 2012, 183–88). Andrews affirms that “by the end of [the Cultural Revolution] it had become conventional to speak of portraits of Mao in religious terms, as though they actually embodied a god. . . . the festivities surrounding publication of Liu Chunhua’s painting in 1968, appeared to deify the image of Chairman Mao, as though it was inhabited by the divinity himself” (Andrews 1994, 342).

Although Liu’s direct source of inspiration is unknown, I have identified a Renaissance image of Saint Paul as bearing a close similarity to Liu’s painting (figure 9). When we compare the two paintings, we see a clear resemblance in the infra-cultural language. European Renaissance styles of oil paintings were important pedagogical techniques of Soviet art schools, and their influence was clearly felt in China (Sullivan 1996, 135). Observe, however, the vernacularizing modes: Mao wears a scholar’s gown and cloth shoes, he carries a traditional umbrella, and the background landscape, although continuous with the billowing clouds in the Saint Paul painting, is also continuous with the Chinese idea of yunhai, or the “sea of clouds.” At the same time, we see a modern hero striding with a clenched fist to liberate the workers. These elements are part of the message the painting seeks to convey and may also be seen as negotiating the modern-traditional distinction and combination that is so important to nationalism.

What appears to be passed over is the infra-cultural biblical figuration in Renaissance art. Indeed, the grammar of Renaissance Christian art is so clear that a painted copy even hung briefly on the walls of the Vatican on the impression that it was the painting of a Chinese missionary (Perry 2012, 186). According to Jack M. Greenstein, Renaissance

Figure 8. Liu Chunhua, Chairman Mao Goes to Anyuan, 1922; reproduced in Perry (2008).
devotional painting sought to assimilate the worshipper’s soul to God or the saints by movements, relationships, or postures that are most suggestive of a narrative in which the image or figure is grasped. Holy figures are set in an “idealized earthly setting without beginning or end” (Greenstein 1999, 237). The landscape of blue skies, great, rolling clouds, and distant mountaintops centers on the superhuman figure of Mao and contrasts sharply with the Daoist-inspired landscapes in which humans often are not much more than transient specks. But it is also a deeply religious figuration; we might even say that socialist realism innovates by converting God into Man. Certainly later

Figure 9. San Pablo, Vicente Requena el Joven, circa 1597. Image from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Requena-san_pablo.jpg
posters and paintings of Mao during the Cultural Revolution were to be found with religious icons of halos and sunbursts surrounded by devoted masses of every nationality, often holding the red book to their hearts. There is a double passage here that revolutionary discourse would have difficulty accepting: the foreign, especially imperialist, and the religious. They become acceptable through mediation in the cultural sensorium.

As Ramaswamy (2008, 840) shows, the map of India often came to be draped in the sari of Mother India bearing the imagery of the goddesses who also populated—together with male gods, sages, and heroes and martyrs—the commercial posters and prints discussed by Pinney. To be sure, many nationalists around the world circulated images of a divine or semidivine female figure holding up the national flag or otherwise embodying the nation, but few seemed to notice or care about the foreign provenance of the idea. The passions elicited by emergent vernacular, or perhaps vernacularizing, images appeared to saturate the realm of the senses, although they could and were affiliated with different goals, political and religious. But by the time of extremist nationalist fervor in the twentieth century, revolutionary heroes such as Bhagat Singh (who was executed) or Subhash Chandra Bose were depicted offering their dripping, bloody heads to Mother India in the gesture of sacrifice and martyrdom. For our comparative purposes, perhaps the most relevant of these is the print created upon the assassination of Gandhi in 1948, Bapuji on Eternal Sleep (figure 10).

While Gandhi is often seen in prints and paintings assimilated with gods and sages, including Jesus and the Buddha, Michelangelo’s Pietà appears to evoke the fully Christian imagery of sacrifice and compassion produced during the Renaissance (figure 11). Michelangelo’s marble sculpture in the Vatican shows the Virgin Mother grieving the body of her crucified son. The print Bapuji on Eternal Sleep (circa 1948) repeats the motif with Gandhi’s assassinated body held by a mourning Mother India across her lap (Neumayer and Schelberger 2008, plate 261; Ramaswamy 2008). While the cladding and relational postures of the two figures in the two pictures are similar, the Indian poster bears an enormous flag and shows blood from the fresh stigmata of three bullet holes on Gandhi’s body forming a pool on the ground below. The landscape-figure design is also vaguely evocative of the map. The quality of the print is popular and the printmaker anonymous. It is also most likely that the Vatican Pietà was unknown to most people and politicians in India. Imagine how Hindu nationalists responsible for the assassination of Gandhi may conceive of this framing of martyrdom: would they be repelled by its Christian origins or proclaim that it was a fitting end to a traitor of the Hindu nation?

Through these cases, I have tried to show how by assimilating the grammar of infra-culture, the cultural sensorium becomes the soil and the ground—in the gestalt sense—for circulatory motifs and figures to germinate and grow the passions, “structures of feeling,” and a second nature into an emergent vernacular. What is considered “traditional” or unique in the nationalist imaginary is itself a complex interplay of contemporary, living practices deriving from circulatory currents. It can be debated whether the Renaissance (and post-Renaissance) naturalist and humanist depiction of Christian devotionalism could become such a powerful ground for circulatory, globalizing nationalism because of its salvationist character or because of the global power of Christian nations in the period. Yet the fact that the infra-culture of these representations is not seen to be transgressively foreign suggests that little-c culture has been busy working to weave these materials into our everyday lives.
CONCLUSION

I have discussed circulation from a time when the nation-states of the West dominated the shape of the twentieth-century world. Today the world is different, not only because of its multipolarity, but because media and infra-culture have become so much more complex. Nonetheless, the methodological argument I seek to make still holds. Given that societies will continue to regulate passage and blockage, we need a gestalt of perception and understanding: the figure that we see operate in a society may well be enabled by a ground that we have not yet begun to see.

The circulatory nature of historical processes discloses a planetary process in which the dispersive impact generated by intentional human agency extends that process.
temporally and spatially. This is a step in a move that widens the meaning of history into other dimensions. Recent scholarship, following the “ontological turn,” pays close attention to interactive networks of actors and “actants” in the material, organic, and inorganic world that generate unintended consequences and counter-finalities accompanying human activities (Latour 2007; LeCain 2017). I have tried to show that the organic sensorium of culture can equally play such a role beyond the radar of historical consciousness.

As the global “technosphere”—referencing the assemblage of human and technological systems, including infrastructure, transportation, communications, power production, financial networks, and bureaucracies, among others—circulates with intensifying velocity, the catastrophic counter-finalities of techno-human-initiated activities also become increasingly frequent and multiscale. Indeed, only COVID-19 seems to have initiated a countercirculation that has been—temporarily—able to slow the technosphere. If human agency has unleashed these circulations to the point of near-escape velocity, it will be upon this agency to rein it in. Might we need to follow our senses, the ground of our activities a little more, to better align our more exclusivist discursive and intellectual faculties with the globally circulatory, shared sensibilities of history.

The rationale for trying to grasp history in its circulatory dimension is both simple and deep: the nation form has been the dominant mode of identity for most of the world over the last couple of centuries, and it is structured to engage in a competitive race for global resource domination. In turn, this competition has contributed significantly to two world wars and to the ravaging of the global environment. China is
already a global superpower and with its population size and pattern of growth, India will also have a major impact on global developments. There is an urgent need for these societies to recall and realize their aspirations and dreams of the postcolonial dawn. The forces for global cooperation and checks against predatory activities upon people and nature have been much weaker, in great part because of the nationalist imperative for gross domestic product growth and the constellation of interests legitimated by this imperative. As scholars of Asia, we call on the leaders of China and India to transcend their narrower interests—revealed sharply in recent events in Kashmir, Xinjiang, the Galwan Valley, and elsewhere—and create or renew frameworks to lead the planet into genuine collaboration and cooperation.

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List of References


