Dōgen’s Fallibilism: Three Fascicles of Shōbōgenzō*

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Charles S. Peirce is well known for upholding epistemological fallibilism as coexisting with (or even as a condition for) the production and growth of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. Fallibilism is considered to be a basic method of his pragmatism.¹ There are a few aspects of his fallibilism,² but the basic point is that knowledge claims should go hand in hand with a willingness to revise one’s beliefs. Not only inductive knowledge but also deductive inquiry is (according to Peirce) subject to revision: “Theoretically, . . . there is no possibility of error in necessary reasoning. But . . . in practice and in fact, mathematics is not exempt from that liability to error that affects everything that man does. Strictly speaking, it is not certain that twice two is four.”³ Dagfinn Føllesdal argues that this epistemological fallibilism is an important aspect of Husserl’s thought as well,⁴ and I believe that it is a general characteristic of (or at least some fraction of) so-called Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life) around the turn of the twentieth century (broadly defined; that is, not only Dilthey, William James, and Henri Bergson, but also Husserl, Heidegger, Nishida Kitarō). At least some of these philosophers consider fallibilism in relation to their ideas of history.

Peirce also regards “the community of inquirers, rather than the individual’s self-consciousness” as the proper subject of (scientific) inquiry.⁵ “The

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⁴ Dagfinn Føllesdal, personal communication with author in 2004–2006 (at Stanford University).

⁵ Cooke, Peirce’s Pragmatic Theory, 7.
very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in knowledge."\(^6\) This emphasis on sociality or collectivity in scientific inquiry is closely related to his epistemological fallibilism, his critique of intuition and introspection, and his "semiotics" or the study of signs and consciousness.\(^7\)

What interests me regarding these problems of fallibilism is not so much the thought of Peirce himself as that of Bergson, especially the latter’s definition of the "virtual," as expounded by Gilles Deleuze.\(^8\) In Bergson’s idea of virtuality, the object is “that which has no virtuality,” while the subject has a “qualitative multiplicity."\(^9\) In *Time and Free Will*, Bergson distinguishes between the “subjective” and the “objective” by means of the continuity and multiplicity of (numerical) division. He writes that "we must distinguish between the unity which we think of and the unity which we set up as an object after having thought of it,” and between “number in process of formation and number once formed."\(^10\) The formation of a number implies the formation of discrete units (e.g., the formation of number “five” implies the formation of five discrete units), with each of these units being a spatially continuous unity, but these units are only provisionally indivisible. “We form the same number with halves, with quarters, with any units whatever,”\(^11\) and this numerical division, which can go on indefinitely, does not essentially change the nature of what is divided. We already know what these halves, quarters, and so on, are like, before we mentally divide the original unity. This is the numerical multiplicity of what we call “objectivity.” Being divisible to an unlimited extent, each subdivision (no matter how small it is) is already realized in the mental image we form of its original unity. Each of these halves is “actual and not merely virtual”\(^12\) in the originating unity. In contrast, the subjective does not show the same numerical divisibility. Deleuze mentions the following example, originally discussed in *Time and Free Will*: “A complex feeling will contain a fairly large number of simple elements, but as long as these elements do not stand out with perfect clearness, we cannot say that they are completely realized, and as soon as consciousness has a distinct perception of them, the psychic state which results from their synthesis will have changed for this very reason."\(^13\)

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\(^7\) Cooke, *Peirce’s Pragmatic Theory*, 9–14, 16.


\(^9\) Ibid., 41.


\(^11\) Ibid., 82.

\(^12\) Ibid., 84.

\(^13\) Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 42; see also Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, 84.
plex feeling (e.g., a mixture of love and hatred) is duration (durée), and when this duration divides up, its nature changes in the process of this division (e.g., love and hatred). When a subject of inquiry has a distinct perception of her/his love and/or hatred, the qualitative multiplicity has transformed itself into these divided elements. For this reason, often, the complexity of the “virtual” appears self-contradictory. Bergson himself does not frame this problem of self-reflection in epistemological terms (nor does Deleuze). It is, however, possible (or even necessary) to consider it epistemologically; due to the self-affective nature of self-reflection, the subject’s inquiry into nonnumerical multiplicity is subject to revision. The virtual, therefore, is inseparable from the fallibility of our self-knowledge.

Bergson defines “virtuality” as opposed to actuality, not as opposed to reality.14 As discussed above, numerical subdivisions are already actualized in the image of the objective, but the multiplicity of the subjective is merely virtually (not actually) realized.15 Deleuze writes: “Actualization comes about through differentiation, through divergent lines, and creates so many differences in kind by virtue of its own movement.”16 That is, whereas actualization of the virtual is self-difference as such, the potential and the real (of an object) is merely conceived vis-à-vis their quantitative differences. Again, fallibilism plays a role here; a main difference between the two concepts, the virtual (defined vis-à-vis the actual) and the potential (vis-à-vis the real), is the epistemological fallibilism embedded in the former. For Bergson, the virtual is a multitude, or self-difference as such. One could even regard it as his historical awareness, insofar as “history” here is defined in terms of its singularity and the fallibility of (scientific) inquiries.

It is possible to discuss “virtuality” (or historical awareness) in Dōgen’s (1200–1253) Shōbō Genzō 正法眼蔵 (Shōbōgenzō hereafter) fascicles. As I will argue below, the virtual (as defined above) is none other than the everyday for much of Dōgen’s thought; therefore, virtuality constitutes an essential feature of his Buddhist practices. Specifically, there is one expression in his writing with a meaning similar to the idea of virtuality: “twining vines” (kattō), which Dōgen uses twice in his Shōbōgenzō fascicles.

Given Peirce’s critique of intuition, the fallibilism of his philosophy of science is not surprising. It is more noteworthy that epistemological fallibilism plays a role in Bergson’s thought (though Bergson himself does not conceive of it epistemologically), as it raises an issue concerning his method of immanence. For the same reason, given Dōgen’s language of immanence, historical awareness in his Shōbōgenzō would be far more interesting to consider than his discourses of immediacy. The present study pursues historical awareness

14 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 42–43.
15 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 84.
16 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 43.
in Dōgen; I will argue that fallibilism is a constitutive idea in some fascicles of Shōbōgenzō.

Bergson regards prereflective awareness as virtual awareness, while Peirce clearly has a more epistemological stance to virtuality. The nature of the phenomenon is the same, regardless of one’s standpoint (e.g., whether one considers its epistemology or ontology). That is, there are certain phenomena that cannot simply divide without changing their basic nature. These phenomena resist numerical (quantitative) cognition by their nature. Self-knowledge is an important instance of this nonnumerical multiplicity. From an epistemological point of view, the fallibility of our self-knowledge is one and the same fact as its virtuality. Self-reflection changes itself due to its own self-differing nature. I will argue that at least some fascicles of Shōbōgenzō show Dōgen’s commitment to this nonnumerical multitude, and his fallibilistic stance. This is a basic thesis of this article.

18 Heine, Dōgen: Textual and Historical Studies, 26–27.
20 Nishiari Bokusan’s (1821–1910) Shōbōgenzō Keitokki is one of the first modern commentaries written in the Meiji period. Watsuji’s book, mentioned in the previous footnote, is often considered an early investigation of Shōbōgenzō outside the sectarian circle.
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Among an ever-growing body of contemporary scholarship on Shōbōgenzō, there are significant attempts to situate this treatise within doctrinal debates in its era (the thirteenth century). In Dōgen Shisō Ron (On Dōgen’s thought), Indian-Buddhologist Matsumoto Shirō proposes the immanent Buddha-nature theory (bushō-kenzai-ron 仏性顯在論; IBN hereafter) as a basic standpoint of the early Dōgen.21 (By “early” Dōgen, Matsumoto means the period before 1247–48. This is the period in which Dōgen composed all the fascicles I discuss in this article.) Matsumoto contrasts the IBN theory with the innate Buddha-nature theory (bushō-naizai-ron 仏性內在論), which he regards as a target of Dōgen’s criticism. Matsumoto writes: “I construe the ‘tathāgatagarbha’ doctrine as having two types, the ‘innate Buddha-nature theory’ and the ‘immanent Buddha-nature theory.’ Here the ‘innate Buddha-nature theory’ refers to the view that ‘Buddha-nature exists inside human beings, especially inside their bodies’ and the ‘immanent Buddha-nature theory’ is the view that ‘Buddha-nature is completely manifested as things’ or ‘things themselves are manifestations of Buddha-nature.’”22 Since IBN postulates that the Buddha-nature is “immanently manifested” (kenzai 顯在), Matsumoto equates IBN with the so-called hongaku 本覚 (original enlightenment) doctrine, the idea that the Buddha-nature is already manifested in the phenomenal world. Matsumoto’s basic thesis is that Dōgen’s standpoint in his early years (i.e., before 1247–48) was the immanent Buddha-nature theory, and that it is from this standpoint that Dōgen criticized the innate Buddha-nature theory. If this is the case, one might even argue that Dōgen’s early thought is in conflict with the basic teaching of pratītya-samutpāda (dependent origination). This issue has been debated for decades, both in Japan and in the United States. Most notably, it has been debated in the Critical Buddhism (hihan būkyō 批判仏教) movement and reactions to it.23 Matsumoto further argues that Dōgen changed his standpoint from the IBN to “deep faith in causality” (the title of a fascicle in the twelve-volume redaction of Shōbōgenzō), which Matsumoto considers essential to Dōgen’s late thought after 1247–48, the years when he left Kyoto for Echizen.

For the present discussions, rather than examine Matsumoto’s contentious claims of “critical theology” (hihan shūgaku)24 and his criticism of dhātu-vāda, I will focus on the interpretative hypothesis he proposes concerning Dōgen’s writings dated before Dōgen’s move to Echizen. The main

22 Ibid., 28.
23 For further details, see Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, eds., Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, Nanzan Library of Asian Religion and Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997).
24 The term “hihan shūgaku” is often customarily translated into “critical theology.” The present article follows this translational convention. Strictly speaking, however, since “shūgaku” means sectarian (Buddhist) studies (“shingaku” is a translation of “theology”), the term should be translated otherwise. I owe this point to a reviewer of the previous version of this article.
difficulty I have with Matsumoto’s overall argumentation is not so much his critique of the IBN theory as his conflation of Dōgen’s historical awareness with his “deep faith in causality.”25 I do not consider history to be causal; to the contrary, history is never fully conceived in terms of causality, and I even regard this denial of historical causality as an essential feature of Dōgen’s thought. In other words, I consider history to be virtual in the Bergsonian sense, with the fallibility of our self-knowledge being at the heart of its definition.26

In another respect, I conceive history as closely associated with the “long-run” production (in Peirce’s terms) of (new) knowledge. If history is defined thus, the notion of causality (which is central to Buddhist doctrines) raises complex issues. I attempt to read this complexity (regarding historical causality) into some Shōbōgenzō fascicles. In fact, as Matsumoto himself writes, Dōgen’s remarks on causality are often contradictory.27 In the following, I will use the term “history” (or “philosophy of history”) primarily in the sense of the production and growth of knowledge (and its revisability).

The methodology of Matsumoto’s critical Sōtō studies can be summarized with a few central claims, including “never taking anything as an absolute or mystical state” and the admission that “Dōgen changed his ideas during his lifetime.”28 It is possible to construe Matsumoto’s methods as a science of theology, or scientific theology. I agree with Matsumoto’s hihan shūgaku (critical theology) in this respect; insofar as he sees the production or growth of knowledge in Dōgen’s lifetime trajectory. This is compatible with my own reading of Shōbōgenzō, and this is why I referred at the beginning of this article to Peirce’s conception of fallibilism as a condition for scientific knowledge. I do not necessarily share Matsumoto’s reading of Dōgen on the basis of the twelve-fascicle redaction, emphasizing causality. However, I do believe that it is possible, and even unsurprising, that Dōgen changed his ideas and standpoints as he wrote those many fascicles, within

25 The usage of the term “historical” is my own. Matsumoto himself does not use the term with reference to Dōgen’s thought.
26 When the subjects of an inquiry already have complete knowledge of the progression of an event, this eventuality does not count as history. The idea of history is closely associated with the production (and discovery) of new knowledge. Some version of epistemological fallibilism is crucial for this notion of history. If the omniscient existence can foresee the outcome of an event, that existence is not a subject of history. In this sense, it is possible to define history as a system of particulars for which no generality obtains.
27 As Matsumoto writes (in Dōgen Shisō Ron, 109–11), Dōgen increasingly discusses deep faith in causality in his late writings. In one fascicle “Deep Faith in Causality” (regarded as a late composition of his), he emphasizes the importance of causality and criticizes the view that there is the unchanging (ultimate) truth that transcends causality. In another fascicle “Great Practice” (composed in 1244), he argues that this criticism (of the ultimate) is not simply right. It is clear from these facts that causality is a complex issue for Dōgen.
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a relatively short period of time. Presumably, new thoughts and discoveries arose in the process of composing those fascicles.

Admittedly, this is a modern scientific conception of knowledge, but it explains apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies in Shōbōgenzō texts, which many scholars have pointed out already. Steven Heine, for example, explains the inconsistencies in the Genjō Kōan 現成公案 (Actualization of reality, or Enacting absolute truth) fascicle on the basis of Ishii Shūdō’s “emphasis on the role of the horizon in defining . . . the capability and limitation of the act of perception for the enlightened and unenlightened.”

Since Matsumoto’s claims are based on a close reading of the same fascicle (among a few other Shōbōgenzō fascicles), I will examine Heine’s discussion of the fascicle in some detail. (Heine refers to Matsumoto’s book, too.) Heine focuses on the following sentence in the Genjō Kōan fascicle: “When perceiving one side, the other side is concealed” (一方を読ずるときは一方はくらし).

After summarizing a few traditional and modern readings of this sentence and the fascicle (by Goshō, Kurebayashi, Yoshizhu, and Matsumoto), Heine introduces Ishii’s hermeneutic reading, and explicates it in terms of the finitude of human perception. Ishii’s basic claim (according to Heine) is that “it is impossible for anyone to recognize all phenomena, so that the awareness of even an enlightened person is limited.” That is, Ishii attempts to construe (at least some of) Shōbōgenzō fascicles as representing Dōgen’s commitment to the horizonal structure of perception.

An increasing amount of literature underlines this hermeneutic nature of Shōbōgenzō. I have elsewhere examined a few Shōbōgenzō fascicles using a similar hermeneutic framework, specifically the Katto (Twining vines) fascicle composed in 1243. Heine’s article generally supports Ishii’s her-

29 Heine, Dōgen: Textual and Historical Studies, 66.
30 Matsumoto, Dōgen Shisō Ron, 191–258.
31 Heine, Dōgen: Textual and Historical Studies, 42 (English translation); and Dōgen Zenji Zenshū 道元禅師全集, 7 vols. (Tokyo: Shunjūsha 春秋社, 1988–93), 1:5; vol. 1 (1991) and vol. 2 (1993) of Dōgen Zenji Zenshū were edited and annotated by Kawamura Kōdō 河村孝道校注; vol. 5 (1989) was edited and annotated by Suzuki Kakuzen 鈴木格禅 et al. Hereafter, Dōgen Zenji Zenshū will be cited as DZZ; unless otherwise noted, all translations of DZZ are my own.
32 Heine, Dōgen: Textual and Historical Studies, 44.
33 Ibid., 64.
34 There are different terms to refer to the framework (or background assumptions) that constitutes each particular hermeneutic practice, including “horizons” or “horizonal” structures, hermeneutic “circles” or “circularity,” or sometimes hermeneutic “situations.” I prefer to use “circularity” (as a hermeneutic situation is circular), but other scholars use different terminologies.
35 Takushi Odaigiri, “Shōbōgenzō ni okeru kabyūsei no rinen: Katto no maki wo megutte,” Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū 58, no. 1 (December 2009): 91–94. The article mostly discusses a few major characteristics of Dōgen’s hermeneutic thought in Katto fascicle, with some reference to Muijō Soppō fascicle. In the present study, I specifically focus on Peirce’s epistemology and Bergson’s philosophy of immanence (especially his concept of virtuality), examining them as underlying issues of Shōbōgenzō’s fallibilism.
meneutic interpretation of the *Genjō Kōan* fascicle. Thomas P. Kasulis discusses the influence of hermeneutics in Dōgen studies in recent decades (his article on this topic was translated into Japanese by Nara Yasuaki, a Sōtō-sectarian scholar at Komazawa University).³⁶

One should note that the emphasis on the finitude of perception in these hermeneutic readings of various *Shōbōgenzō* fascicles resembles Peirce’s epistemological fallibilism; more generally, it resembles Peirce’s view of scientific knowledge. As I stated already, for Peirce, epistemological fallibilism is a condition for the growth of knowledge (especially scientific), and a basic method of his pragmatism. An individual’s perception is finite; this is why it is not always consistent and is subject to revision, and the proper subject of scientific inquiry is the collective (rather than individual self-consciousness). The finitude of individual perception causes inconsistencies, but it enables the (long-run) growth of knowledge when it goes hand in hand with a willingness to revise one’s beliefs. It is even possible (as I will argue below) to find some similarity between Peirce’s highlighting of the sociality or collectivity of scientific inquiries and Dōgen’s hermeneutic standpoint. That is, Dōgen seems to think that the proper subject of inquiry is not an individual but a community of inquirers.³⁷

I disagree with Matsumoto’s readings not because his choice of the twelve-fascicle redaction is arbitrary (one can hardly avoid such arbitrariness of an interpretation) but because his emphasis on deep faith in causality does not fully clarify the nature of the historical awareness that I observe in Dōgen’s writings. If *hihan shūgaku* attempts to resuscitate *Shōbōgenzō* as a modern text, it would be necessary to evaluate the significance of history (as defined above) in the treatise. It would be, in other words, necessary to read this treatise as a form of philosophy of history. Matsumoto’s readings are not compatible with Ishii’s hermeneutic approach, because Matsumoto underestimates the significance of Dōgen’s philosophy of history in his early years. I believe that the key to all these problems is Dōgen’s fallibilism. Fallibilism both explains Dōgen’s historical awareness and his hermeneutic standpoint. Below I would like to read some of *Shōbōgenzō* fascicles as a science of history, that is, as clarifying his fundamental doctrines concerning inquiries into history.³⁸ I would like to clarify this interpretation of various *Shōbōgenzō* fascicles.


³⁷ As I will argue later, there is some textual evidence that, for Dōgen, satori is not an individual experience; or more precisely, there is no such a thing as satori experience.

³⁸ I define “history” here vis-à-vis its epistemological structure, rather than in terms of historical descriptions per se. Essentially, I consider history to be subjective or reflexive, and to be closely related to the concept of self-knowledge. History is characterized by its indeterminacy (no one knows what will happen in the future) and therefore it is fundamentally a virtual phenomenon (in Bergson’s sense).
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MUJÖ SEPPÔ: SYNESTHESIA AND VIRTUALITY

Mujō Seppô 無情說法 (Insentient preaching) is the forty-sixth fascicle of Shōbōgenzô (in the seventy-five-fascicle redaction) composed in 1243 (according to the colophon in the text). The fascicle was written in the same year as Kattô (the thirty-eighth in the seventy-five-fascicle redaction, 1243), another fascicle I will discuss later in this article. Dōgen composed most of his well-known fascicles of Shōbōgenzô during a period of a few years beginning in 1240. These two fascicles are relatively unknown compared to other fascicles written in that year (e.g., Zazengi [Principles of Zazen] and Butsudô [The Way of Buddha], both in 1243), and in the preceding years (Uji [Time-Being] and Sansuiyô [Mountains and Waters Sutra], 1240; Busshô [Buddha-Nature], 1241; Kaitin Zanmai [Ocean Seal Samadhi], 1242; Zazenshin [Lancet of Zazen], 1242). Given the remarkable productivity of Dōgen during this short period of time, it is natural to assume that these fascicles have some thematic correlations with one another.\(^{39}\) In particular, I will discuss the correlation between the two fascicles written in 1243, Mujō Seppô and Kattô.

The two fascicles have a specific textual correlation. In both fascicles, Dōgen mentions his Chinese master Rujing’s words,

先師古仏云、葫蘆藤種纏葫蘆。

[My master the ancient Buddha said, “The bottle gourd is a wisteria, [its vines are] entangled with another bottle gourd.”]\(^{40}\)

One purpose of this article is to clarify this particular expression, which appears twice in Shōbōgenzô. Although the contexts in which he refers to this sentence differ, it is possible to think of it as representing Dōgen’s (either doctrinal or practical) commitments, one element of which I call his “fallibilism.” In (at least) this one fascicle (Kattô), the complexity of hermeneutic situations is explicitly compared to an “entanglement” of “wisteria’s

\(^{39}\) The title of the fascicle, Mujō Seppô (Insentient preaching), represents a certain cosmological commitment. Carl Bielefeldt writes in his introduction to the fascicle in the Sōtō-Zen Translation Project that “it was not uncommon in Dōgen’s day for Buddhists to imagine that the natural world, including inanimate objects, was somehow expressing Buddhist truths.” Bielefeldt mentions another fascicle of Shōbōgenzô, Sansuiyô (Mountains and Waters Sutra [1240]), which tends to be interpreted as manifesting Dōgen’s commitment to such a view (Sōtō-Zen Translation Project [SZTP], accessed January 4, 2015, http://scbs.stanford.edu/sztp3/translations/shobogenzo/translations/mujo_seppo/pdf/mujo_seppo-introduction.pdf). In the present context, it is worth noting that this view, which one can observe in many other fascicles listed above, is related to what Matsumoto calls IBN theory, the view that the Buddha-nature is immanently manifested in the phenomenal world.

\(^{40}\) DZZ 1:417; also DZZ 2:12; I consulted DZZ for Shōbōgenzô text, and also compared its commentaries with those in Nihon Shisô Taikai 日本思想系, vol. 12 Dōgen, edited and annotated by Terada Tôrō 寺田徹 and Mizuno Yahoko 水野弥穂子 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1970); and in Iwanami Bunko, Shōbō genzô, vols. 1 and 2, edited and annotated by Mizuno Yahoko 水野弥穂子 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1990). However, it goes without saying that, since they occasionally disagree, I had to rely on my own judgments to interpret many Shōbōgenzô texts. All the translations of Shōbōgenzô text and its commentaries are my own in this article.

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I will investigate how this is related to Dōgen’s fundamental commitment to fallibilism and I will provide evidence (both internal and external to the text) for this interpretation.

According to Nakamura Hajime, in Ch’an/Zen tradition, the term “kattō” signifies (delusion and confusion caused by) words and letters (the term sometimes signifies kōan). But Dōgen proposes to interpret this term differently. As I will discuss later, in the other fascicle titled Kattō, the term refers to the multitude (and the self-contradictory quality) of delusion (avidyā), which is a complex and intersubjective experience itself. In this sense, Dōgen’s “kattō” is almost synonymous with “the virtual” in Deleuze-Bergson’s definition. The term does not necessarily have a negative connotation in these fascicles, contrary to its preexisting usage in Ch’an/Zen Buddhism.

Rujing’s expression plays a central role in the Myōjō Seppō fascicle. The following is the passage where Dōgen mentions Rujing’s words on “kattō” in the fascicle. I will discuss the passage in relation to Nagatomo’s concept of “synesthesia” and clarify “the insentient preaching” as a form of virtuality:

The essence of what the high-master [Dongshan] says here is that one’s ears cannot hear the insentient preaching, but one’s eyes hear it. Furthermore, there is hearing of the thorough/penetrating-body, hearing of the entire body. Even if you do not completely understand [the high-master’s] eye-hearing, you should fully learn and cast off this “when the insentient beings preach, the insentient can hear it.” Because this truth/rationale has been transmitted, my master the ancient Buddha Tiantong [Rujing] said, “The bottle gourd is a wisteria, [its vines are] entangled with another bottle gourd.”

The passage is Dōgen’s commentary on two Chinese Ch’an/Zen stories (1 and 2 below, respectively), the second of which is about the high-master Dongshan (whom Dōgen respects highly). The first story (1) goes as follows: A monk asks his master whether insentient beings preach and understand the Dharma, and if they do, why he (the monk) does not hear their preaching. The master answers that insentient beings are constantly preaching, and sacred beings can hear it.

1 The monk asks, “sir, do you hear their preaching?” The master answers, “No, I don’t.” The monk says, “if you don’t hear it, how do you know the insentient beings

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41 Dogen uses these expressions (“entanglement of wisteria’s vines” and “kattō”) interchangeably in these fascicles.


43 In many Shōbōgenzō fascicles, Dogen mentions his teacher Nyōō (Rujing)’s words. Not all of them appear in Nyōō Goroku (Collective sayings of Rujing). For further discussions, Kagamishima Genryū compares these two texts in the article, “Nyōō Goroku to Dogen Zenji,” Komazawa Bukkyōgakubu Kenkyū Kiyō 41 (1983): 1–15.

44 DZZ, 2:12.
preach?” The master says, “Fortunately, I don’t hear it. If I hear it, I’m equal to the sacred, then you don’t hear my preaching.”

A few interpretations of this passage are possible, but what is important is that this is the pretext for another story (2) in the Ch’an/Zen tradition, which Dōgen subsequently mentions in the Mujō Seppō fascicle. In the second story, the high-master, Dongshan, asks the same or similar questions as the monk asks in the first story and exchanges similar dialogue with his teacher. But the high-master composes a poem in reply to his teacher, when the teacher says, “You don’t even hear my preaching, how would you hear the insentient preaching?”

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So strange, so strange,
The insentient preaching is beyond [grasp of] thinking.
If you try to listen by ears, you never hear it,
If you hear it by eyes, you will get it.

The aforementioned quote from the fascicle (beginning with “The essence of what the high-master [Dongshan] says here is . . .”) is Dōgen’s commentary on this (high-master’s) poem (2), which is the key to this entire fascicle. The high-master (in the second story) says in the verse that one never understands the insentient preaching if one tries to hear it by “ears”; one understands it once one hears it with “eyes.” Dōgen’s comment is that one may hear the insentient preaching with “eyes,” or, more precisely, one should hear it with “the thorough/penetrating-body,” or “the entire body.”

Shigenori Nagatomo explains this episode with the concept of “synesthesia.” Nagatomo correctly argues that the point of this passage is not that one hears the preaching with ears or eyes, but that one “casts off (datsuraku

45 DZZ 2:3.
46 Shinji Shōbōgenzō has the following kōan. The Mujō Seppō fascicle is essentially Dogen’s commentary on this particular Chinese Ch’an kōan story:

The great enlightened master Dongshan studied with Yunyan, and asked him,
 “Who can hear the insentient preaching?”
Yunyan said, “The insentient can hear the insentient preaching.”
The master said, “Sir, do you hear it?”
Yunyan said, “If I could hear it, then you wouldn’t hear my preaching.”
The master said, “If so, then I do not hear your preaching.”
Yunyan said, “You don’t even hear my preaching, how would you hear the insentient preaching?”
The master immediately made a verse upon hearing this [to convey his enlightenment]: So strange, so strange,
The insentient preaching is beyond [grasp of] thinking.
If you try to listen by ears, you never hear it,
If you hear it by eyes, you will get it.

(DZZ 5:204: Mana/Shinji Shōbō Genzō 真正正法眼藏 148)

47 DZZ 2:6.
or *totsuraku* 脱落")⁴⁸ the very idea of “hearing” the preaching. Nagatomo defines “synesthesia” as a “confusion” or an exchange of different sensory faculties.⁴⁹ He further writes: “Upon seeing a flower, we immediately recognize that it is a flower, ‘immediately’ in the sense that the judgment takes place without the intervention of intellectual reflection. . . . To use Husserl’s terminology, it is pre-predicative judgment; a pre-predicative or pre-reflective judgment, since the judgment takes place spontaneously, without thinking.”⁵⁰ Nagatomo relates this “pre-reflective” (synesthetic) judgment to Merleau-Ponty’s “bodily intentionality”⁵¹: “Considering a ‘perspectival’ givenness of every perception, which presupposes a bodily presence relative to the thing perceived,” Nagatomo writes, “it would seem that some aspect of the body is involved in forming a pre-reflective or ‘pre-predicative’ judgment.”⁵² Bodily intentionality is prereflective and synesthetic because it is one’s reflective awareness that conceives it as distinct sensory faculties.

One issue to be raised here is whether a judgment arising from this embodied intentionality (be it prereflective or pre-predicative) is subject to revision upon reflection. Nagatomo does not consider this question thoroughly. In my view, what is called a “pre-reflective” judgment here has a more intricate structure than Nagatomo seems to assume. As Bergson argues in a passage above, “as soon as consciousness has a distinct perception of them,” these judgments have already changed themselves as a result of this reflective awareness. A judgment that “this is a flower” is an actualization of the virtuality which has come about through reflective differentiation. It is an outcome (rather than the origin) of such differentiation (what Bergson calls “non-numerical” division). For this reason, the judgment is subject to revision, that is, it is fallible. It arises from a multitude or, in Bergsonian terms, the virtual.

I agree with Nagatomo insofar as I conceive this judgment as an instance of synesthesia. I believe, however, that its epistemological structure needs to be clarified more thoroughly. I do not regard the judgment as prior to intellectual reflection (the judgment is an outcome of intellectual reflection, and therefore it already has an epistemological structure). Nor do I think of synesthesia as a special or unusual kind of experience. Visual perception is already an embodied experience, and it is synesthetic by nature.

The concept of “haptic visuality,” a term coined by a film scholar Laura U. Marks, is worth a brief discussion in this context.⁵³ Haptic visuality is (ac-

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⁴⁸ Nagatomo transcribes 脱落 “totsuraku,” though it is often transcribed “datsuraku.”
⁵⁰ Ibid., 137.
⁵¹ Ibid.
⁵² Ibid.
cording to Marks) “a visuality that functions like the sense of touch” by triggering physical memories of smell, touch, and taste.\(^{54}\) She argues that “if vision can be understood to be embodied, touch and other senses necessarily play a part in vision.” That is, the eyes themselves need to “function like organs of touch.”\(^{55}\)

I would like to extend Marks’s basic observation to what Nagatomo calls “synesthetic experience.” “Hearing a voice with eyes” is not an unusual experience, as sensual experiences are holistic in nature. It is simply that one does not usually recognize this synesthetic nature of multimodal perception.

One should note, again, that this synesthetic (multisensorial) perception resembles Bergson’s (qualitative) multiplicity. As soon as consciousness has a distinct perception of one element of the multiplicity, the nature of the perception changes qualitatively. When the subject becomes clearly conscious of “hearing” the preaching, the perception ceases to be synesthetic. Synesthesia is virtual; the virtuality of synesthesia is a central theme of the fascicle titled *Mujō Seppō*.

Importantly, the fascicle presents synesthetic experience in a dialogical (intersubjective) situation, that is, in the context of a teacher-disciple relation (“hearing the preaching”). Marks, too, underlines the haptic’s intersubjective dimension. According to Marks, the haptic is “a form of visuality that muddies intersubjective boundaries”;\(^{56}\) it draws on a relation that is organized by the relationship between mother and infant, in which “the subject . . . comes into being through the dynamic play between the wholeness with the other . . . and the awareness of being distinct.”\(^{57}\) The subject of the haptic visuality is entangled with the other in this dynamic interplay; it is such dialogical entanglement that creates qualitative multiplicity. Marks sees the haptic as sensory multimodality resembling the interplay between mother and infant, but the author of the *Mujō Seppō* fascicle considers a similar phenomenon in Buddhist dialogues.

Intersubjectivity (which is closely associated with the virtuality of self-reflection) is an important element of Dōgen’s embodied intentionality. Dōgen consistently emphasizes the importance of a teacher-disciple connection in Zen practices. Dōgen’s emphasis on intersubjectivity resembles Peirce’s rejection of individual self-consciousness as a subject of scientific inquiry. This intersubjective dimension of Dōgen’s fallibilism is explicated in the other fascicle composed in the same year, *Kattō*. Rujing’s words, “The bottle gourd is a wisteria, [its vines are] entangled with another bot-
tle gourd” (on which the title Kattō is based), is specifically about this intersubjective dimension. However, before I move on to this fascicle, I would like to discuss the idea of language explicated in another fascicle, Dōtoku.

Dōtoku: Dōgen’s Semiotics

Dōtoku 道得 (Expressing discernment), the thirty-third fascicle in the seventy-five-fascicle redaction, was composed in 1242 (again, according to the colophon in the text). The fascicle begins with a well-known statement that “various Buddhas and Patriarchs are none other than expressions of discernment” (諸佛諸祖は道得なり).58 Dōgen made a twist on the grammar of the sentence; rather than writing “various Buddhas and Masters express[ed] discernment” (諸佛諸祖は道得する), in which the emphasis is more on the subjects of expressions (i.e., various Buddhas and Patriarchs), Dōgen states that they are none other than expressions of discernment (諸佛諸祖は道得なり). In the latter statement, the focus is on expressions of discernment (not Buddhhas and Patriarchs). Clearly against the stereotypical Zen emphasis on intuitive discernment and denial of language (不立文字: not establishing words and letters), the fascicle underlines the semiotics of discernment as essential to Buddhist practices.

In one part of the fascicle, Dōgen touches on an anecdote of Bodhidharma’s (the first Patriarch in the Zen lineage) dharma transmission to Huike (the second Patriarch in the same lineage). In the story, there are four disciples and each is said by the master to have got the master’s “skin,” “flesh,” “bone,” and “marrow,” respectively. The story is related to a particular set phrase, “hi-niku-kotsu-zui 皮肉骨髄” (skin, flesh, bone, marrow).59 Huike, the second Patriarch in Chinese Ch’an, is said to have got the last. Huike expresses his discernment by “three bows and standing in one place,” unlike the other three, who replied by words. Dōgen specifically mentions Huike’s expression of discernment as follows:

How can the depth of the expression of discernment by three bows and standing in one’s place be equal to the depth of the expressions of discernment of those skin-flesh-bone-marrow people?60

This sentence appears to underline a deeper discernment of Huike’s expression. In the Kattō fascicle, it is explicitly stated that Huike got the marrow, as the deepest of the four disciples. However, Dōgen does not simply

58 DZZ, 1:374.
59 Shinji Shōbōgenzō (a book of 300 Chinese kōans collected by Dogen) has a kōan story on Bodhidharma’s hi-niku-kotsu-zui (DZZ, 5:230: Mana/Shinji Shōbō Genzō 真実正法眼蔵 201). The content of this fascicle is based on this particular story. Since the kōan story is essentially the same as the one mentioned in Kattō 葛藤 fascicle, I do not quote the Shinji text here.
60 DZZ, 1:375.
regard Huike’s expression as the ultimate or deepest one. Later, in *Kattō*, he specifically rejects such an interpretation. In *Dōtoku*, he emphasizes “casting off” skin-flesh-bone-marrow all together, or “casting off” mind and body. When casting off [body-mind], skin-flesh-bone-marrow all equally confirm casting-off, country-land-mountain-river all confirm casting-off. . . . Even though it is neither by one’s mental capacity nor bodily capacity, the expression of discernment naturally arises.61

In this sentence, again, Dōgen uses the term “datsuraku” (casting off). In the *Mujō Seppō* fascicle, the term is used to refer to the virtuality of insentient preaching (as I discussed above). The term has a similar meaning in this fascicle, too. The passage seems to argue that Huike’s deep expression of discernment ultimately transcends the relative standing of the four expressions of discernment (including his own) altogether; hence it transcends the linearity of *dōtoku* expressions.

Epistemologically, it would seem difficult to interpret these passages without assuming some form of fallibilism, if not entirely the same as Peirce’s version. While, in some parts of the fascicles, Dōgen emphasizes the profundity of Huike’s expression of discernment, he also insists that skin-flesh-bone-marrow all be cast off equally. In the *Kattō* fascicle, he even warns his readers62 (his intended audience) against thinking of Huike’s expression of discernment (“marrow”) as superior, arguing that the marrow is not necessarily closer to the truth than the skin (see the next section). These contradictory descriptions of Huike’s *dōtoku* expression suggest that it is not assumed that there is a linear progress toward the Buddhist truth. Expressions of discernment are to be understood in a context-dependent manner, specifically, dependent on teacher-disciple interactions.

In this correlation, one should consider, again, the sentence from the *Genjō Kōan* fascicle: “When perceiving one side, the other side is concealed.” As discussed already, according to Ishii’s hermeneutic reading, this sentence is about the “finitude” of human perception; it is impossible for anyone to recognize all phenomena. If we can extend this principle to *dōtoku* expressions of the four disciples, it follows that each expression of discernment has a horizontal structure as well. A consequence of this hermeneutic reading is that expressions of discernment are context-dependent and one should not simply think of one expression as superior to the others.

Viewed from a more ontological point of view, the denial of the ordinary interpretation (the interpretation that Huike got the deepest teaching) is related to the virtuality of the expressing-discrimination experience. When

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61 Ibid.
62 According to the colophon of the *Dōtoku* fascicle, the fascicle was written intently on the fifth day of the tenth month of 1242 (*DZZ*, 1:379).
one’s perception of the dōtoku experience becomes clear, the experience itself has already taken a different form. When numerical divisions arise, one comes to see marrow as marrow, or nonmarrow as nonmarrow. Naturally, when this numerical division takes place, there has already been a qualitative change in one’s self-understanding. But the fascicle urges us to consider the virtuality itself prior to such a qualitative change.

**Kattō: Fallibility and Intersubjectivity**

The thirty-eighth fascicle of *Shōbōgenzō* is titled *Kattō* 葛藤, another (relatively unknown) fascicle composed in 1243. It mainly deals with Dōgen’s ideas about master-disciple interactions. Having discussed expressions of discernment by various students of Buddhism in the Dōtoku fascicle, Dōgen now shifts his focus to the intersubjective correlation of master-disciples per se. On the whole, the fascicle manifests the hermeneutic nature of Dōgen’s thought, providing more textual evidence for his fallibilism.

When emphasizing collectivity in (scientific) inquiries, arguably, Peirce is also committed to a coherence theory of truth. Some scholars underline a certain coherence theory in Peirce’s thought. However, even if coherence may play some role in Peirce’s theory of truth, “a symbol’s coherence with other symbols is a condition of its correspondence with a real object (and conversely), and, therefore . . . a truly coherent set of symbols cannot fail to represent reality as it is.”

63 In the case of Dōgen, it is neither correspondence nor coherence that is the object of his inquiries. If one considers the virtual quality of self-reflection, this is a natural conclusion. Of course, when he discusses the Buddhist truth, he does not mean any kind of correspondence. But his writings do not simply endorse a coherence theory either, presumably because the virtual does not necessarily yield coherent self-knowledge. For example, hate and love of another person are not mutually exclusive, but can coexist. This virtuality of self-knowledge is an essential feature of both self-reflection and intersubjective correlation with others. It is this self-contradictory quality of the virtual that is a focus of all three of the fascicles composed around 1243, especially *Kattō*.

The key to this fascicle is obviously the title, *Kattō*. Carl Bielefeldt’s translation and introduction is available electronically in the Sōtō-Zen Translation Project. In his translation, the title *Kattō* is rendered “twining vines,” but, as Bielefeldt writes in his introduction, the same word can also mean an “entanglement,” a “complexity,” “complications,” or “difficulty.” Bielefeldt further explicates a special connotation of the term “kattō” in Zen tradition: “Zen texts typically treat the term as referring to (especially intellec-

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tual and linguistic) obstacles to be cut through, but Dōgen prefers to see it here as the ‘entanglement,’ or ‘intertwining,’ of master and disciple.\(^64\) That is, (according to Bielefeldt) Dōgen uses the term “kattō” in order to emphasize the intimate interaction between master and disciple. My reading of the text below basically agrees with Bielefeldt’s interpretation.

The word “kattō” also means, metaphorically, “agony,” “conflict,” “conflicting motivations,” or even “inexplicability” in a person’s thought or emotion; or an intersubjective conflict between people. Indeed, many of these phenomena are the “virtual” in Bergson’s definition, and therefore (at least in some contexts) it is possible to construe “kattō” as almost synonymous with Bergson’s concept of virtuality. Already in these various connotations of the title word, one can see Dōgen’s fallibilistic tendency. The subject matter of this fascicle further confirms this interpretation.

The content of the fascicle is, again, about a set phrase, “hi-niku-kotsu-zui” (skin, flesh, bone, marrow). That is, Dōgen mentions these expressions in the same transmission anecdote of Huike as in Dōtoku fascicle. But, in the present fascicle, Dōgen more explicitly rejects an ordinary view that Huike has got the deepest teaching. Rather, he emphasizes the hermeneutic complexity of master-disciple interactions:

You should realize that even to the second Patriarch, he might as well have said, “you got my skin.” Even if he said, “you got my skin,” the second Patriarch should have transmitted the essence of the true Dharma. The transmission is not dependent on superiority or inferiority of “you got skin,” or “you got marrow.” . . . The body-mind of the master is the master’s skin-flesh-bone-marrow. It is not that the marrow is closer [to the truth] and the skin less.\(^65\)

Peirce considers scientific inquiry intersubjective and “long-run.” “While inquiry does not begin with secure foundations,” Cooke writes, “it can progress slowly toward secure knowledge.”\(^66\) As already mentioned, Peirce’s theory of scientific inquiry and its revisability is not compatible with a naïve concept of correspondence; it has to end up with some idea of coherence. The fascicle’s doctrinal standpoint is similar to this, in that it denies the linearity of practices.

I would like to discuss two issues here. First, Dōgen denies that there is any final truth or goal of one’s practice. “The marrow” is not deeper than “the skin.” That is, there is no hierarchy among these four “entanglements,” namely, the four disciples’ interactions with the master. Second, he then insists that even if one gets “the marrow,” there are further ways to go beyond it.


\(^{65}\) DZZ, 1:419.

\(^{66}\) Cooke, Peirce’s Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry, 47.
Don’t think there is no way to go further than the marrow. There are various ways to go further ahead.67

These points are compatible with Dōgen’s well-known thesis of practice-enlightenment unity, Shushō Ichinyo 修証一如. The thesis underscores the nondistinction of practice and its goal, rejecting any teleological model.68

How did each “entanglement” happen then? If Dōgen denies any teleological thinking about the practices, what does he think the master-disciple interaction is like? Dōgen argues that there are many different ways the teacher and a disciple get “entangled.” That is to say, each “entanglement” has its hermeneutic situation, the complexity of which differs from one to another. The way Huike interacts with the master is different from the ways other disciples interact with the master, each having their own hermeneutic situations. One can only understand such an in-depth interaction vis-à-vis its hermeneutic situation. Dōgen emphasizes the horizontal or holistic nature of the hermeneutic situation.

In general, words and understanding do not necessarily depend on each other. When the master is talking to his four disciples, he says, “you got my skin.” [But] if there are a hundred thousand disciples after the second Patriarch, his words should be in a hundred thousand ways. There is no completion or exhaustion.69

The last sentence is crucial: “There is no completion” (究尽あるべからず). Since there is no goal, there is no completion. Also, since there are many different ways the master and a disciple may be “entangled,” there is no ultimate way to complete words or practices. There are numerous passages in the fascicle that indicate similar ideas.

You have to know that the master’s skin-flesh-bone-marrow is not to show that [attainment is] deep or shallow. Even though their respective understandings differ, the master’s words are only “(you) got me.” The point is that there is no adequacy or inadequacy in the expressions, “got my marrow,” and “got my bone,” no adequacy or inadequacy in the master’s interaction [with his disciples], just like picking up and dropping a grass.70

Both Dōgen’s criticism of teleology and his emphasis on plurality of intersubjective interactions suggest his commitment to fallibilism. The picture is very similar to coherence theories of knowledge. Since there is no ultimate insight, all that one should (or can) pursue is provisional knowledge, conditional on one’s hermeneutic situations.

67 DZZ, 1:421–22.
68 It is also important to point out that this is closely related to his discussion of the concept of time in the Uji fascicle. In Uji, Dōgen criticizes any teleological thinking about time, an assumption that there are some basic facts of reality as the ultimate goal of practices.
69 DZZ, 1:418.
70 Ibid.
Dōgen’s Fallibilism

From yet another point of view, this can also mean that all these hermeneutic situations are fallible. (If there were one correct way to “entangle,” others would have been described as inferior to this correct one, but the fascicle doesn’t say this.) That is precisely why one’s practices get “entangled,” or “complex,” or even “inexplicable.” Since there is no straightforward “path” to be taken to reach a goal (and there isn’t any goal), one has to cut off the very idea of “cutting” the entanglement. This is in fact what Dōgen writes about his master’s words:

Generally, saints attempt to study [how to] cut off the root of the entanglement, but they never study that to cut [it] off is to cut the entanglement by means of the entanglement. They do not know that the entanglement is entangled with the entanglement. 71

This passage is crucial for the present discussion. Dōgen emphasizes the fact that the entanglement is cut “by means of the entanglement.” That is, both a master and a disciple are in the middle of the same hermeneutic situation, and only by means of this shared conundrum a disciple’s conundrum is to be “cut” (截断). In short, one should know the ongoing complexity of such interrelations. Dōgen specifically states that this is the point his master Rujing makes in the aforementioned quote, “The bottle gourd is entangled with another bottle gourd.” Thus, it is possible to think that Dōgen refers to his master’s words in this fascicle in order to emphasize the hermeneutic nature of the master-disciple interactions. The goal is not to cut off the disciple’s entanglement. The point is precisely its opposite: One should be caught in the very entanglement.

My interpretation of the fascicle (especially its crucial metaphor, kattō) as revealing Dōgen’s hermeneutics is further buttressed by its (partial) resemblance to hongaku-related doctrines. According to Nakamura, the last statement (“the entanglement is entangled with the entanglement” [葛藤をもて葛藤をまつぶ]) should be understood as follows: since there is no essential nature of defilement or enlightenment, one should understand that enlightenment is not distinct from defilement. 72 That is, Nakamura regards this statement as expressing nonduality. As Bielefeldt writes, the title of the fascicle (kattō) can be interpreted as a metaphor representing bonnō (defilement) (kleśa in Sanskrit) or obstacles practitioners encounter in their religious practices. If Bielefeldt’s interpretation of the metaphor is correct, the fascicle’s practical standpoint seems akin to hongaku doctrines, in that both commend a certain form of nondualistic thought. That is, the Kattō fascicle is similar to certain hongaku doctrines with respect to its emphasis on phe-

71 DZZ, 1:416.
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nomenal immanence and its rejection of teleological thinking. Both characteristics indicate Dōgen’s hermeneutic standpoint, and also its partial similarity with *hongaku* thought. But the crucial difference is that Dōgen, but not necessarily *hongaku*-related thought, elucidates the fallibilistic nature of (intersubjective) hermeneutic situations.

In summary, Dōgen’s hermeneutics has two faces: intersubjectivity and fallibilism.

My master the ancient Buddha said, “The bottle gourd is a wisteria, [its vines are] entangled with another bottle gourd.”

There are two points made in this remark. First, the bottle gourd (that is, a master) is of the same kind (a wisteria) as another bottle gourd (a disciple). (That is, they have similar hermeneutic backgrounds.) Second, they are both “entangled” in the same (ongoing) hermeneutic situation. These two points suggest the hermeneutic tendency of Dōgen’s thought. Every understanding is fallible, but this fallibility is a condition for historical awareness, for the growth of (scientific) knowledge.

Furthermore, the fascicle seems to imply also that neither the teacher nor a disciple has understanding that is infallible. That is why it is said that “twining vines are entwined by twining vines,” and “twining vines are succeeded by twining vines.” These are direct metaphors for the teacher-disciple practice as Dōgen sees it. This is compatible with the hermeneutic readings proposed by Heine, Ishii, and others (as mentioned above).

The similarities of Dōgen’s thought with Peircean pragmatism (or more specifically epistemological fallibilism) and Bergsonian metaphysics of the virtual have been clarified, but one should also consider some differences between them. In the *Genjō Kōan* fascicle, Dōgen states that “for the self to attempt to practice and confirm multitude things, is delusion; for multitude things to come forth and to practice and confirm the self, is real understanding.” This statement attests to the denial of a certain self-notion in Dōgen’s thought. It also seems related to his idea of the teacher-disciple interaction as just discussed above, in particular, the metaphor of “twining vines,” which represents the multitude (and intersubjectivity) of the interaction. (Marks’s subject of the haptic visuality is similarly characterized by this denial of a self-notion.) This critique or denial of the self is naturally implied in Peirce’s and Bergson’s standpoints as well, but it is much more central to Dōgen’s version of fallibilism.

For Dōgen, fallibilism arises primarily from the multitude itself, not from one’s subjectivist standpoint.

*73 DZZ*, 1:417.

*74 DZZ*, 1:2.
CONCLUSION

I have explored in this article the possibility of interpreting a few fascicles of *Shōbōgenzō* as evidence of Dōgen’s hermeneutic standpoint, especially his fallibilism. Drawing on Peirce’s work on scientific knowledge and its collective nature and on Henri Bergson’s work on virtuality, my examination has clarified the self-contradictory and intersubjective quality of the virtual as essential to Dōgen’s thought. The key to this interpretative possibility is the term “kattō,” and Dōgen’s own commentaries on his master Rujing’s teaching, especially one particular axiom, “The bottle gourd is a wisteria, [its vines are] entangled with another bottle gourd.” I have clarified the axiom’s specific meaning in the *Mujō Seppō, Dōtoku*, and *Kattō* fascicles. I argue that these fascicles can be read as extensive commentaries on Rujing’s saying, which manifest Dōgen’s fallibilism. Insofar as these fascicles are concerned, Dōgen’s hermeneutic stance is evident, and so is his fallibilism. There are some contextual (or even conceptual) differences between the thought of Dōgen and Peirce (or Bergson) (e.g., the former’s denial of a certain self-notion), but they are all committed to some version of fallibilism. A source of *Shōbōgenzō*’s intellectual rigor is undoubtedly the critical attitudes of fallibilism in Dōgen’s historical awareness and practical commitment to intersubjectivity.